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As the importance of forensic science
in the legal system has grown, debate
has arisen about the way forensic sci-
entists should characterize their findings
in order to communicate most effec-
tively with legal fact-finders. This article
will focus on one aspect of that debate:
the framing of conclusions involving ele-
ments of probability. In particular, we will
examine the contentious issue of whether
forensic scientists, when asked to provide
evidence that will be used to evaluate var-
ious competing propositions about phys-
ical evidence, should consider the prior
probabilities that those propositions are
true. Disputes about this issue have arisen
in a number of contexts and recent exam-
ples suggest that opinions still diverge
(e.g., Budowle et al., 2011; Biedermann
et al., 2012). In this comment, we will
argue that a reasoned approach to this
issue depends on the role that forensic sci-
entists are expected to play in the legal
system.
To illustrate the underlying issues, let
us begin with a generic example. A foren-
sic scientist is asked to perform DNA
profiling analyses of blood found at a
crime scene and to compare the result to
the DNA profile of a defendant who is
charged with the crime. The defendant’s
guilt or innocence will be determined by
a jury. The jurors’ decision will depend
in part on their assessment of two propo-
sitions of interest—H1: that the defen-
dant was the source of the blood; and
H2: that someone else was the source of
the blood. What should the forensic scien-
tist tell the jurors about the results of the
DNA analysis?
The jurors might want the expert to tell
them definitively which hypothesis is true,
or to give them particular values for the
so-called source probabilities—saying, for
example, that there is a 0.998 probability
the defendant is the source of the blood
and only a probability of 0.002 that some-
one else was the source. But there is no
way for the forensic scientist to reach such
conclusions based on the forensic findings
alone. To assess source probabilities, the
forensic scientist must also consider other
evidence in the case.
Suppose, for example, that the expert
found that the defendant and the blood
from the crime scene share a set of genetic
markers found in one person in 1 mil-
lion in the relevant population. Without
considering other evidence in the case,
the expert might make statements about
the conditional probability of finding these
results under the two hypotheses of inter-
est. For example, the expert might con-
clude that the shared genetic markers were
virtually certain to be found under H1
(defendant was the source), but had only
1 chance in 1 million of being found
under H2 (someone else was the source).
Based on this assessment the expert might
also provide to the jury a so-called like-
lihood ratio—saying, for example, that
the DNA profiling results are 1 mil-
lion times more probable if the defen-
dant rather than some other person was
the source of the blood. But a likeli-
hood ratio is not the same thing as a
source probability. The likelihood ratio
reflects the relative probability of the find-
ings under the relevant propositions, not
the probability that the propositions are
true.
The only coherent way to draw con-
clusions about source probabilities on the
basis of forensic evidence is to apply
Bayes’ rule, which requires that one begins
with an assignment of prior probabili-
ties to the propositions of interest (e.g.,
Robertson and Vignaux, 1995; Finkelstein
and Fairley, 1970). Bayes’ rule speci-
fies how one ought to combine prior
probabilities with the results of a DNA
profiling analysis in order to find the
so-called posterior probabilities that the
defendant is the source of the blood.
But the Bayesian approach will only work
if the expert can begin with a prior
probability.
This brings us to the crux of the debate:
whether forensic scientists should even
try to specify prior probabilities and, if
so, how. It is occasionally suggested that
forensic scientists should assume equal
prior probabilities. This is sometimes
described as a position of neutrality
and is often justified with references
to vague accessory “principles,” such as
the “Principle of Indifference” or the
“Principle of Maximum Entropy,” bor-
rowed from other disciplines and contexts
(Biedermann et al., 2007).
A prominent illustration can be found
in paternity cases. When DNA analysts are
asked to assist in the assessment of whether
a particular man is the father of a child,
they usually analyze the profiles of the
mother, child, and the accused man, and
assign conditional probabilities that the
genetic characteristics found in the child
(Ec) would be observed under two relevant
hypotheses specifying that the accused
is the father (H1) and that some other
man (from a particular reference popu-
lation) is the father (H2) conditioned on
the alleged parents’ DNA profiles (Em and
Eam, for the mother and the accused man,
respectively). In some cases, the analysts
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limit themselves to reporting the ratio
of these conditional probabilities—i.e.,
Pr(Ec|Em,Eam,H1)/Pr(Ec|Em,H2)—which
is a likelihood ratio (although it is also
referred to as the paternity index). But
quite often, analysts go farther. They
assume that the prior odds of H1 and
H2 are equal and then, in accordance with
Bayes’ rule, they multiply the prior odds
by the likelihood ratio (paternity index)
to determine the posterior odds of pater-
nity. Recall that odds are defined as a ratio
between two probabilities; in this par-
ticular scenario, it is the ratio between
Pr(H1) and Pr(H2). The posterior odds
are typically restated as a probability.
For example, if the DNA evidence sup-
ports paternity with a likelihood ratio of
1 million some analysts would report a
probability of 0.999999 that the accused is
the father.
While this approach is commonly used
in civil paternity cases, courts in the United
States have generally not allowed analysts
to characterize their findings in this man-
ner when paternity tests are offered as
evidence in criminal cases—e.g., to prove
the defendant committed rape or incest by
showing he fathered a particular child. The
assumption of equal prior odds appears
to conflict with the presumption of inno-
cence to which defendants in criminal
trials have traditionally been entitled. In
the view of most commentators, assuming
that the accused starts with a probability
of guilt of 0.5 falls far short of presum-
ing him innocent. More fundamentally,
making any default assumption about the
prior probability is seen as violating the
obligation of the legal system to deliver
individualized justice based on the facts of
each case (the attentive reader might have
noted that circumstantial information I
was omitted from the above mathemati-
cal notation). Consider that an assump-
tion of equal priors is applied regardless of
any other evidence in the case: an accused
man who offers proof that he is infer-
tile due to azoospermia and was not on
the same planet as the mother at time
of conception (i.e. an azoospermic cos-
monaut) is treated the same as any other
man. While the jury can take the other
evidence into account they may have diffi-
culty integrating it with the “probability of
paternity” delivered by the forensic expert,
or they may mistakenly assume that
the “probability of paternity” is all they
need consider.
Another suggested approach is that
forensic scientists take upon themselves
the responsibility for assessing the prior
probability of the relevant hypotheses
before updating them based on the
scientific findings in accordance with
Bayes’ rule. For example, in the context
of missing person identification, commen-
tators declared that “[t]he forensic DNA
community needs to develop guidelines
for objectively computing prior odds”
(Budowle et al., 2011, p. 15). The major
objection to this approach, in the context
of a criminal trial, is that it may result in
forensic scientists going beyond their sci-
entific expertise and usurping the role of
the fact-finder. In order to assign prior
contextually meaningful probabilities, the
expert would need to take into account all
of the evidence in the case. But experts
are rarely in a good position to evaluate
the non-scientific evidence and have no
business doing so. The legal system places
the responsibility for evaluating the evi-
dence in a case on the fact-finder, whether
judge or jury, not the expert witness. Jurors
are carefully chosen for the task, are often
shielded by evidentiary rules from infor-
mation that the legal system determines
that they should not consider, and are
carefully instructed on the presumptions
to make and standards to apply in reaching
a verdict; experts are not. Allowing expert
witnesses to take into account prior odds
when considering the probative value of a
scientific observation also raises the dan-
ger of double-counting certain pieces of
evidence (Thompson, 2011).
Consequently, many commentators
have suggested that forensic experts have
no role in assessing prior probabilities.
Because posterior probabilities can only be
arrived at by assessing prior probabilities,
they argue that experts cannot legitimately
make statements about posterior probabil-
ities either. As Redmayne explains (2001,
p. 46): “(. . .) the expert should not testify
in terms such as (. . .) ‘the blood probably
came from the defendant’, because one can
only reach conclusions of this sort by mak-
ing assumptions about the strength of other
evidence against the defendant.”
There may, however, be circum-
stances in which a forensic scientist could
appropriately assign prior probabilities
and use them as a basis for reaching other
conclusions. One such circumstance arises
when the expert is given the responsibil-
ity of making an overall evaluation of a
case. For example, coroners are sometimes
given full responsibility for determining
the cause and manner of a death for legal
purpose. (In jurisdictions of the Anglo-
Saxon tradition, a coroner is a government
official who investigates human deaths and
makes independent determinations as to
their time, manner, and cause. He should
not be confused with the medical exam-
iner, who merely provides information to
a court in the course of criminal prosecu-
tion or civil litigation but has no judicial
authority of his own). In such cases, the
expert should certainly take account of all
relevant evidence, including both scien-
tific and non-scientific factors. There is
no danger of the expert usurping the fact-
finder when the expert is the fact-finder.
The matter becomes more complicated,
however, when an expert who has made
a determination in the role of fact-finder
is subsequently asked to present evidence
to another fact-finder, as when a coro-
ner who has determined that a death was
due to homicide rather than suicide in an
inquest is asked to testify in a subsequent
criminal trial. In such cases, the dangers
of usurpation and double-counting of
evidence discussed above may still loom
large.
Whether forensic scientists should take
account of the prior probability of the
hypotheses they are asked to help evalu-
ate is a complicated question. The answer
depends on the role the forensic scien-
tist will be playing in the legal system.
If forensic scientists will make the ulti-
mate determination, for legal purposes,
with regard to a particular proposition
of interest, then they should, and indeed
must, consider their prior probabilities
that the hypotheses are true. If, how-
ever, the truth of the hypotheses will be
addressed by someone else—e.g., a judge
or jury—and the forensic scientists’ role
is limited to providing expert assistance,
then forensic scientists should generally
confine themselves to assign the condi-
tional probability of the scientific findings
under the given hypotheses of interest, and
should leave to the legal decision maker
the task of assessing prior and posterior
probabilities.
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